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is not an orderly course of procedure.2 3 However, an orderly course of
procedure does not require a jury trial, 24 nor an appeal. 25 An orderly course
of procedure does not require a court to weigh the evidence, but it does
require it to examine the entire record, to ascertain the issues, to discover
whether there are facts not reported,
and to see whether or not the law has
26
been correctly applied to the facts.
The holding of the principal case, that the known use of perjured testimony by the prosecution is a violation of due process, is an extension of the
requirements of an orderly course of procedure. The Fourteenth Amendment
does not mention such, nor have previous decisions so held. Yet it is now
law that the known use of perjured testimony is prohibited by the doctrine
of due process of law. It is undeniable that the object of the due process
clause, the protection of every citizen in his personal and property rights
against the arbitrary action of any person or authority 27 would be violated
by such action on the part of the prosecuting authorities of a state, but that
does not make it law. The answer to the question, Why is it law?, lies in the
United States Supreme Court. That body determines the law of the United
States; therein lies the real origin of the doctrine of due process of law.
The Supreme Court, with respect to the known use of perjured testimony
and the doctrine of due process, did not find the law; it made and is still
making it by its interpretation of the Constitution. 28
H. P. C.

Constitutional Law - Equal Protection of the Law - Garnishee Act.
Appellant was a judgment debtor and sought to enjoin appellees, a justice of
the peace and a constable, from issuing and levying an execution upon 10
per cent of the wages due appellant from his employer. Appellees would
have been acting pursuant to the terms of Chapter 61, Acts 1925, commonly
known as the Indiana Garnishee Law of 1925. Thus the issues raised the
validity of this act. Held, the Garnishee Law violates Section 23, Article 1
of the Bill of Rights of the Indiana Constitution, as well as the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 1
Declaring unconstitutional a garnishment statute is rather novel in
view of the fact that there were garnishee laws even as far back as
colonial days,2 and that today such proceedings are generally authorized
throughout the states.3 Thus, to better understand the action of the court
here, it is well to bear in mind the constitutional and statutory provisions
relevant to this question as they were admirably set out in the principal case.
23 Frank v. Mangum (1915), 237 U. S. 309 (Ga-) ; Waterman and Overton, Federal
Habeas Corpus Statutes and Moore v. Dempsey (1933), 1 U. Chi. L. Q. 307.
24 Jordan v. Massachusetts (1912), 225 Mass. 167, 114 N. E. 291; Crane v. Hahlo
(1922), 258 U. S. 147 (N. Y.).
25 State of Ohio v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist. (1930), 281 U. S. 74 (Ohio).
26 International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (1930), 280 U. S. 291

(C. C. A).

27 R. G. Lydy, Inc. v. City of Chicago (1934), 356 IIl. 230, 190 N. E. 273; People
v. Belcastro (1934), 356 Ili. 144, 190 N. E. 301; Wulzen v. San Francisco (1894), 101
Cal. 15, 20, 35 P. 353; McKinster v. Sager (1904), 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854; Hovey
v. Elliott (1897), 167 U. S. 409 (N. Y.).
28 Willis, Due Process of Law Under the United States Constitution (1926), 74 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 339.
,Martin v. Loula (1935), 194 N. E. 178 (Ind.).
2 Treadway v. Andrews (1850), 20 Conn. 384, 392, referring to statute of 1784;
Ancient Charters and Laws, Mass. Bay, c. 267.
3 28 C. J. 17.
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The 1925 Garnishee Law simply provides for the service of execution
upon any individual or firm from whom is due to a judgment debtor any
debts, earnings, salary, wages, income from trust funds, or profits, such
execution to become a lien not to exceed 10 per cent of the amount due the
judgment debtor and to be a continuing levy until the entire execution is
satisfied. This execution is only issued after an execution on a previous
judgment has been returned, unsatisfied, and the act specifically provides for
its issue "notwithstanding any exemption laws now in force." 4 But the
Bill of Rights of the state Constitution sets out the necessity of wholesome
exemption laws to apply to debtors, 5 and such provision being ineffectual
without legislative action6 the General Assembly subsequently enacted such
laws. Thus, at the time of the passage of the Garnishee Act of 1925, the
property of any resident householder not exceeding $600 was exempt from
execution processes, 7 this being increased to $1,000 in 1933 if the judgment
debtor owned real property.8 Then, when the Garnishee Law was provided
for, the only question which seemed to present itself was whether the executions on wages, income, etc., therein provided for were also subject to the
general exemption laws, and it was held that they were not.9 Thus, the law
had the effect of removing those enumerated sources of income from the
scope of the exemption laws applicable to all other debtors.
At first blush the constitutional question involved would seem to be
whether or not the legislature had violated the mandate of Section '22,
Article 1 of the Indiana Constitution calling for reasonable exemption laws.
But that the legislature is not bound by any rigid rules as to the enactment
or retention of exemption provisions is evidenced by the statutes denying
exemption against holders of mechanic's liens, purchase money obligations,
or taxes' 0 and decisions denying it against claims for alimony" or to one
2
not a resident householder at the time although subsequently becoming so.1
However, the determining constitutional point now presented was whether
the Garnishee Law infringed upon any of the personal guarantees of the
Constitution, and it is upon one of these governmental rocks that the Indiana
Supreme Court smashed the small-time creditors' most efficacious method of
recovering, from even the smallest wage-earner.
The Indiana Constitution enjoins the General Assembly from granting
to "any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which upon the
same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens" 13 and this is reiterated in
the famous last clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution prohibiting a state from legislating so as to "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The instant case has held
that to permit a judgment creditor to levy execution upon 10 per cent of the
"debts, earnings, salaries, wages, income from trust funds, or profits" due
and owing to the judgment debtor, or which thereafter becomes due and
owing to him, is a denial of the equal protection of the exemption laws of
Indiana. The opinion points out the alleged arbitrary classification of debtors
4 Indiana Acts, 1925, c. 61.
5 Indiana Constitution, Art. 1, sec. 22.
6 Green v. Aker (1858), 11 Ind. 223; Coppage v. Gregg (1891), 1 Ind. App. 112,

27 N. E. 570; Beard v. Indianapolis Fancy Grocery Co. (1913), 180 Ind. 536, 103 N.
E. 404.
7
8

Burns' 1926, sec. 769.
Burns' 1933, sec. 2-3501.

o Lauer Auto Co. v. Moody (1926), 85 Ind. App. 112, 154 N. E. 501; 2 Ind. L. J. 620.
10 Burns' 1926. sec. 782.

11 Menzie v. Anderson (1879), 65 Ind. 239.
12 Miller v. Swhier (1907), 40 Ind. App. 465, 79 N. E. 1092; Finley v. Sly (1873).
44 Ind. 266, 269: 2 Ind. L. 3. 620, 621.
13

Indiama Constitution, Art. 1, sec. 23.
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in that a judgment debtor with $600 in cash or goods -is exempt from his
contractual obligations while another with that amount in the bank or even
with no property but with some sort of income is not exempt to the extent
of that income.
Now it is the purpose of the above constitutional guarantees to give
general protection against arbitrary and discriminating social control. 14 As
set out by the court in a case involving the federal clause, "The inhibition of
the amendment . . . was designed to prevent any person or class of persons

from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile
legislation."' 15 Although class legislation is forbidden, a classification which
rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction is not. 16 Where there are
rational grounds for so doing, persons or their properties may be grouped
into classes to each of which specific legal rights or liabilities may be
attached. 17 Whether an act which denies to wage-earners and others
set out by this statute, the shield of the exemption laws against their judgment debtors is, or is not, a reasonable classification would require for its
answer a too lengthy discussion of the social, economic, and possibly even
political factors which must certainly have influenced the result here. It
is submitted that this decision is a more stringent application of the quality
clause than even the United States Supreme Court has applied in many
other cases involving legislative classifications for various purposes.
The best recent example of comparable latitude in such discrimination
is found in the case of Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson"s wherein
the Indiana Chain Store Tax Law' 9 was held not to be an arbitrary classification but founded on a reasonable distinction. This court has also upheld separate tax classifications for national banks and various other financial businesses. 20 In fact, it has been in the field of taxation especially,
where variety and flexibility are, if not exactly desirable, certainly popular,
that the Supreme Court has not enforced an iron rule of equality. 21
Somewhat more analogous to the equality clause problem in the principal
case was the statute under consideration in Life and Casualty Co. v. McCray 22 where the court held an Arkansas statute imposing on insurance
companies additional damages for failure to pay a claim was not a denial
of the equal protection of the laws by imposing on a single class of debtors
penalties to compel them to pay their debts. 23 Similar statutes involving
penalties in the form of special damages for failure to pay promptly a particular class of claims against debtors generally, 24 claims against railroads
arising from the breach of a duty undertaken on entering upon the discharge
of a public function, 25 and claims against insurers 26 were considered by the
14 Willis, Treatise on Constitutional Law (to be published), Chap. XV; Cincinnati,
etc., Ry. v. McCullom (1915), 183 Ind. 556, affirmed 245 U. S.632.
15 Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania (1888), 125 U. S. 181, 188.
16 Barbier v. Connolly (1885), 113 U. S. 27; Southern Ry. v. Green (1910), 216
U. S.400; Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. State (1919), 188 Ind. 173, 122 N. E. 584;
Shideler v. Martin (1922), 192 Ind. 574, 136 N. E. 1, 137 N. E, 528; Baldwin v. State
(1923), 194 Ind. 303, 141 N. E. 343.
17 Willoughby, Constitutional Law (1929), sec. 1269.
18 (1931) 283 U. S.527; 7 Ind. L. 3. 179.
'9 Ind. Acts 1929, c. 207.
20 First National Bank v. Louisiana Tax Comm. (1933), 289 U. S. 60.
21 Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway (1930), 281 U. S.146.
22 (1934) 291 U. S. 566.
23 19 Minn. L. R. 119.

etc., Ry. v. Cade (1914), 233 U. S.642.
etc., R. R. v. Matthews (1899), 174 U. S.96; Seaboard Air Line v.
Seegers (1907), 207 U. S.73.
26 Fidelity Mutual Life Assn. v. Mettler (1902), 185 U. S.308.
24 Missouri,
25 Atchison,
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court as merely "a reasonable incentive for the prompt settlement, without
suit, of a class of just demands admitting of special legislative treatment." 27
Of course, it is not contended that the Indiana Garnishee Law came
within the reasonable classification requirements to which the above cases
give lip service, but it is submitted that our state Supreme Court has taken
a step away from the higher court's position of reluctance to disturb these
legislative divisions. Nor is the unyielding certainty of the court as to the
unreasonableness of so classifying debtors entirely invulnerable. Even assuming the wage earners' need of protection since it is inherent in the modern
extensive use of credit that he will assume obligation beyond his means, yet
absolute prohibition of garnishment gives that protection at a disproportionate cost to the creditor. 28 As Professor Brown points out,29 the debtor can
still enjoy 90% of his income free from any claims and the probabilities of
actual hardship because of such levy is extremely doubtful. In view of the
Indiana law invalidating assignments of future wages, 30 the Garnishee Law
of 1925, although naturally unpopular, was, however, one of the least defective
solutions to the above creditor-debtor situation. 3 ' However this may be
the next step in Indiana lies with the legislature.
H. A. A.

ConstitutionalLaw-Validity of the Uniform DeclaratoryJudgment Act.
Appellee prayed for a determination of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a written contract for the sale of shares of stock in a corporation. Although the complaint alleged no invasion of appellee's rights,
the lower court acknowledged the prayer in a judgment rendered pursuant
to the Indiana enactment of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. The
judgment pronounced the rights and obligations which devolved upon the
parties from the construction which the court placed upon the disputed provisions of the contract. This appeal challenges the constitutionality of the
statute. Held, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act does not offend the
Indiana constitution.'
Although a complete realization of the value of preventative justice is
an account in modern history, the declaratory judgment is not an adventure
in the judicial process. Here, as elsewhere in the evolution of human understanding, discovery is nothing more than a consciousness of the old. When
the first judgment was rendered in favor of a defendant a declaratory judgment was given. There was no consequential relief demanding execution;
no one was summoned to conduct or reprimanded for conduct; it was merely
a declaration that a duty did not exist, or, if the duty and its correlative right
did exist, there had been no violation. More pronounced illustrations are
readily available in the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence. An action
to remove cloud from title, the giving of instructions to a trustee, the founding of boundary lines, a suit to construe a will, quia timet-all carry the
impress of their modern sequel, the declaratory judgment. 2 History, then,
is in accord with the recent decisions which have sustained preventative
justice.
27 Yazoo, etc., R. R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co. (1912), 226 U. S. 217; 19 Minn. L.
R. 119.
28 45 Harv. L. R. 1102.
29 2 Ind. L. J.620, 624.
30 Burns' 1933, sec. 40-201.
31

Compare other legislative devices set out in 45 Harv. L. R. 1102.

1 Rauh v. Fletcher Savings & Trust Co. (1935), 194 N. E. 334 (Ind. Sup. Ct.).

2 Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace (1933), 288 U. S. 249; State ex rel.
Hopkins v. Grove (1922), 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82; Farabaugh and Arnold, The
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (1928), 3 Ind. L. J.351.

